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covered differs from industryto industrysome commodities included
in our index, for example,are ready for final consumption. (This
would be true, incidentally,even if we restricted the coverage toraw
materials, since the degree of fabricationto which raw materials are
subjected varies widely.) Unfortunately,the uncertainties as to the
representativeness of our index and itscomponents cannot be entirely
removed; in the first three sectionswe confine the inquiry to industrial
materials output perse; in the final section we consider the relation
between industrial materialsoutput and total industrial production.
(Some further details concerningthe coverage and weighting ofour
index are given in Appendix A.)
ITHE RISE IN TOTAL OUTPUTOF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS
The output of industrialmaterials in the United Stateswas consider-
ably greater at the beginning ofthe second worldwar (1939) than
at the beginning of the first (1914).Our production index (using
1939 values as weights) rises nearly 60%in the twenty-fiveyear in-
terval (Table 1, col. 3). In1939 we produced, among other things,
about twice as much steel, fivetimes as much petroleum, six timesas
much aluminum; consumed 35%more cotton and 50% more tobacco;
and imported six timesas much crude rubber as in 1914. Theoutput
of a few of the commoditiesin our index was smaller in1939 than
in 1914; this was true, forexample, of bituminous andanthracite
coal, lumber, newsprint, wheat flour,and malt liquors.
Although the 60% increase inthe total between thetwo wars is
substantial, the annualrate is less than 2% peryear, and is dwarfed
by the expansions that tookplace during bothwars. In measuring the
percentage changes in the total productionof materials in the two
wars it is not necessary to use thesame weights (values) for both
periods. We therefore base theindex for World War Ion 1914
values, which seemmore appropriate to the situation at thattime than
weights reflecting the scale ofvalues twenty-fiveyears later.2 From
1914 to 1917 the production ofindustrial materials increased32%,
or slightly less than 10% peryear, while from 1939 to 1942 itrose
35%, or slightly more than 10per year (Chart 1).In both wars
2 It is this index for WorldWar I to which we shall refer throughoutthe paper, unless the one using 1939 weights is specificallyindicated.
3 All the charts (exceptChart 5) are drawn ona semilogarithmic scale to facilitate comparison of percentage changes. InCharts 1-4 the indexes for WorldWar II are arbitrarily placed below those forWorld War I; their position in thisrespect does not indicate the actual difference inthe level of production.
4the average annual rate of increase during the first three years was
more than five times the average rate from the beginning of the first
war to the beginning of the second; in other words, the output of
materials expanded more than half as much in the first three years of
each war as in the twenty-five years between the wars.
TABLE 1
Indexes of Industrial Materials Production, 1913-19, 1932, and 1937-42
SOURCES:
1, 2, 3) For a list of series included and their weights see App. Tables 1, 2, 3, and ..
W. W. Stewart, 'An Index Number of Production, 1890-1919, American Economic
Review, March 1921, pp. 57-70. Stewart's total index includes Materials (of farm, forest,
and mine origin), Manufactures (of farm, forest, and mine origin), and Transporta-
tion. We combined his indexes of total materials and total manufactures, eliminating his
index of farm materials (which is based chiefly on crop harvest data) from the result,
and omitting transportation altogether. The indexes were converted from Stewart's
1911-13 base by dividing by the 1914 indexes, and were weighted by Stewart's 1914
weights.
Index of production in basic industries, Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1924, pp.
422-3. Converted from a 1919 base by dividing by the 1914 index, 86.
Computed by us from data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in New Federal Reserve index of industrial Production (1942), and
Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly issues through Sept. 1943. The manhours series were
weighted by their 193 5-39 percentage weights and subtracted from the total index, the
remainder was divided by its percentage weight, and the resulting index was converted
from a 1935-39 base by dividing by the 1939 index, 109. The series and weights are as
follows: Machinery (10.81), Transportation Equipment (5.92), Furniture (1.49),
Other Manufactured Foods (7.94), and Chemicals (6.27). One manhours series, Gov-
ernment Arsenals and Quartermaster Depots, was not eliminated from the total index
because the data were not available. Since the manhours series are not included in the
total index before 1923, the 1919 ñgure was computed by multiplying the 1919 total















(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6)
1913 107 107 68 108 112
1914 100 100 63 100 100
1915 110 108 69 114 112
1916 127 124 79 134 133
1917 132 128 81 137 133
1918 127 124 78 138 128








Considering the degree to which the wartime rates of increaseex-
ceed the long-term rate, to say nothing of the difference in circum-
stances attending the two wars, it is noteworthy that the wartime in-
creases differ so little. As measured by our index, the rise in this war
was indeed larger, but the difference is not clearly outside the limits
of 'errof in our index, i.e., the variations that would result ifrea-
sonable modifications in composition and weightingwere to be made.
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90The magnitude of these variationsis indicated by the otherindexes
assembled in Table 1 and Chart 2.
CHART 2
Variations among Selected Indexes ofIndustrial Matenals Production
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Stewart's index rises 37%from 1914 to 1917, theearly Federal
Reserve Board index 35%;both increases exceed the32% rise in our
index. An index obtained byexcluding the 'manhours series'from the
current Federal ReserveBoard index rises 36% from 1939to 1942,
slightly more than ourindex.4 These other indexesdiffer from ours
in both compositionand weighting (see App.Table 5). The effect
produced by differences inweighting alone is illustratedby our index
constructed with 1939 weights,which rises only 28% from 1914to
4The nature of the manhoursseries and their effect on theindex is discussed in Section
IV. Here it is sufficient to saythat 'when they are eliminated,the coverage of the index
resembles that of the other indexesin Table 1 much more closely(d. App. Table 5).
Throughout this paper the term'current FRB index' means theindex prior to its
revision in October 1943(Federal Reserve Bulletin, Oct. 1943).Although the revision
improved the index in certain respects, ouranalysis was largely completed beforethe
new index waspublished, and since the changes did not seemto call for any revisionof
our conclusions wecontinued to use the unrevised index(except in Chart 6, where the
revised individual production seriescould easily be substituted). Anindex computed
by excluding the manhoursseries from the new indexwould not differ greatly from the





1917. Had we selected a different List of productionseries or altered
our weighting procedure, the results would obviouslyhave been dif-
ferent, and might have indicateda smaller increase in World War H
then in World War 1. (Some furtherexperiments reported in Appen-
dix A do not, however, turnout this way.) The indexes in Table 1
do not suggest a definite conclusionas to the direction of the difference
between the rates of increase intotal output of industrial materials in
the two wars; they do indicatethat the difference is rather small.
Although the indexes in Table1 represent adequately, so faras
variations in composition and weightingare concerned, the kinds of
indexes of industrial productionavailable up to, say, 1939,none can
be considereda truly comprehensive index of total industrial produc-
tion. How well theyrepresent the behavior of the total in wartime is
a moot question, which we reserve for considerationin Section IV and
Appendix A. There is, however,one sort of bias to which indexes such
as ours may be subject, asmeasures of either total industrial produc-
tion or the output of industrial'materials'. In order to maintaincom-
parability our index is basedupon as nearly identical a list ofcom-
modities as possible in thetwo wars. But an index of unchanging
composition is likely to understate,more and more as time passes,
the true rate of increase in thetotal it purports tomeasure, since in the
life history ofa commodity the percentage rate of growthtends to be
large at first, then to taper off,and since in a progressiveeconomy new
commodities are continually beingintroduced.5 Each of the 47com-
modities in our indexwas 25 years 'older' in 1939 than in1914, and
none was as 'young' in 1939as the 'youngest' in 1914; one would
therefore expect our indexto be affected by the retardationof their trends."
The alternative toan index of unchanging compositionis either to
eliminate the 'younger'commodities from the 1914 sampleor to add
'new' commodities to the1939 sample. It is difficult to makeeither
adjustment and at thesame time avoid introducing biases dueto the
changing sample. However,by eliminating from the1914-17 index
commodities whose productionexpands most rapidly from1914 to
1939, we can get a rough notion of howmuch trend. retardation affects
our index. The eight commodityseries that increasemore than 5
per year in this twenty-fiveyear interval seem to constitutea reason-
Cf. Arthur F. Burns, ProductionTrends in the United States since1870. (National Bureau of Economic Research,1934), pp.257-9.
For evidence of the effect of trendretardation onthe rates at which the output of individual commodities expandedin the two wars see Section II.
8
Iable selection for the purpose:7 aluminum,magnesium, petroleum,
natural gas, sulphur, rayon, rubber imports,and calves slaughter. If
we eliminate these seriesfrom the index for the first war the risebe-
tween 1914 and 1917 isreduced from 32 to 27% (using 1914
weights) or from 28 to 26% (using 1939weights). This adjustment,
of course, does not improve theindex for the first war, but it prob-
ably does improve the comparison withthe second. The indications
are that if we couldmake a comparison free from the effectof trend
retardation the difference in the rate of increasein favor of the second
war would be moresubstantial than our total index or theother
indexes in Table 1 suggest.
Two indexes in Table 1 areavailable in monthly form (Table 2
and Chart 3). On a monthly basiscomparisons of the expansion in
production after the start of war in Europe canbe dated more pre-
cisely, and we can carry the comparisoninto 1943 and 1918.8 These
TABLE 2
Industrial Materials Production
Monthly Indexes Adjusted for SeasonalVariation, 1913-19, 1937-43









Por sources see Table 1, notes 5and 6. Annual averages are computed directlyfrom the
averages on the original base.
7 Unless otherwise specified, the individualcommodity series cited hereafter in the text
are production series.
B Other things being equal it would havebeen desirable to use monthly data throughout
this paper. But this would haveseverely limited the industrial scope of thestudy, since
there is a much greater fund ofannual than of monthly data on output,particularly for
World War 1. Our use of annual data isjustified further by the extraordinary length of
the expansions in production inboth wars; the coarser time unit may beexpected to
reveal most of the principal featuresof long expansions, whereas it would be quite
inadequate were the expansions short.
9
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advantages are offset by the factthat the index for WorldWar II,
the current Federal ReserveBoard index excludingmanhours series, has a broadercoverage than the early Federal ReserveBoard index
which we use for WorldWar I. The 27% rise ofthe former index in
the 45 months from September1939 to June 1943 and the33% rise of the latter in the 45months from August 1914to May 1918 sug-
gest that production increasedless rapidly in thesecond war than in the first.However, these figures,which are basedon three-month
averages centered on the months cited,are influenced by erratic ifuc- tuations in the data.'° Ifwe had, for example, usedtwo-month instead of three-monthaverage standings at the start ofwar (which might be justified on the groundthat two-monthaverages are centered closer
to the actual dates of declarationof war by the majorpowersAugust
9The equivalent annualrates of growth arc 6.6 and79% respectively. That theserates are lower than those derived fromannual data (whichapproximate 10% per year) is due partly to the longerperiod covered in the monthlycomparison. If we make the period the same (three years)the monthly indexes rise8.6 and 9.1% peryear from the start of Wars H and1, respectively, to the endof the third year ofwar (September 1942 and August 1917).
10The less jaggedappearance of the World War 11 indexis probably due bothto its wider coverage and to thesmoothing effect of variousdevices used inconstructing it.














- 1401-4, 1914 and September 3, 1939)the percentage riseswould have
been almost identical (32 and 33%).In view of this erraticbehavior
and also of the difference in thecomposition of the monthlyindexes,
we cannot say theyrefute the evidence of ourannual index that the
rate of increase in thesecond war was greater than inthe first. But in
the monthly figures we dofind additional support for ourconclusion
that the difference between the ratesis slight.
****
Does the evidence concerningthe rates of expansion inthe output of
industrial materials mean that wehave done 'better' in this war, or
'just as well', or 'worse'? Inand of themselves suchcomparisons tell
us little about theeffectiveness of the mobilizationof the nation's re-
sources for theprosecution of the war. In thefirst place, the produc-
tion of industrial materials consumesmerely a fraction of the energy
exerted by the nation either in timeof peace orof war. Thetotal out-
put of the nation consistsof commodities and servicesourindex
includes only commodities. Thetotal output of commoditiesconsists
of both agricultural andindustrial productsour index coversonly
industrial products (including thevalue added to agriculturalprod-
ucts processed byindustry). The total output ofindustrial products
consists of finished andunfinished goodsour index omitslarge cate-
gories of finished products.Now it may well be in thenational interest
to sacrifice some partof the output of industrialmaterials in order to
produce, let us say, morefinished munitions, or moreagricultural
products, or to enlarge the army.Of course, economic andother fac-
tors tend to limit the extentof such shifts. The outputof tanks could
not be expandedindefinitely without an increase inthe output of steel.
But there is no reason to supposethat either the possibility orthe de-
sirability of making suchshifts was the same in both wars.In view
of the alternatives, we mayhave expanded our outputof industrial
materials too much in this warand too little in the first, or vice versa.
Second, it may be in thenational interest to alter thecomposition
of the total output ofindustrial materials at the expenseof a smaller
growth, and such changes incomposition as have takenplace (ci.
Sec. II) may have entailed agreater sacrifice in thetotal in the first
war than inthe second, or vice versa. Theincreases in the total, in
other words, must bejudged with respect to thedesirability of the
accompanying changes incomposition. To a certain extent,of course,
this is allowed for inthe weighting schemeof the index, but the
11
Iweight factors (prewar prices) do not allow for the physicallosses
attending drastic changes in the prewar composition ofoutput, how.
ever desirable such changes may be, and in any case the factors them.
selves are of limited significance.
Third, the rate of growth in production isno more important than
the level at the start or at the finish. For example,if the second war
had begun in 1932, and the output of materialshad expanded 28%
in three years, i.e., at the same rateas from 1914 to 1917 (according
to our index weighted by 1939 values),we would have had a smaller
output of materials in 1935 with which to win thewar than we had
in 1917 (cf. Table 1)Although the rate of growth in outputwould
have been the same, the ultimate resultmight not have been. More-
over, it would seem to be much easier, ina sense, to raise the level of
production 28% in threeyears after 1932 than after 1914 and easier
also to maintain that rate ofgrowth for more than three years,12 for
in 1932 we were in the depths ofthe Great Depression, withmass
unemployment and unusedresources of every description at hand,
whereas in 1914 therewas but a moderate depression.
Actually, the war started in1939, and as we have pointed out,pro-
duction was considerablygreater in 1939 than in 1914. Since theper-
centage rates of growth are similar, theabsolute increments since1939
were much larger than those achieved after1914, and the level of
output in 1942 much higher than in1917. To say that this is better
or worse from the standpoint of the endresult would be to predict
the outcome of thewar, and its cost in terms of the alternatives.It is
more feasible to judge the merits of thecase on the basis of theun-
used resources availableat the beginning of thewar.
In this respectour comparisons of the growth inoutput since the
start of the war in Europeseem to benefit from an historicalaccident. Not only are the startingdates of the comparisonscoordinate from
the standpoint of the politicalhistorian, but 1914 and1939 are roughly similar with respectto the relative amount of idleresources on hand. It is true that the firstwar broke out in the midst ofa general business
contraction, and the bottomwas not reached until the latterpart of
11 Actually theoutput of materials increased 41%from 1932 to 1935, accordingto the index in Table 9, column2. It was, therefore,apparently somewhat larger in1935 than in 1917.
127n faa production ddnot reach a peak until 1937.In World War Iour index reaches a peak in 1917; itmay or may not have reacheda peak in 1942 (see Sec. Ill). The total rise inour index from 1932 to 1937(78%) was much larger than from 1914 to 1917 or from1939 to 1942; even the annualrate of increase (12%)was higher.
12
S
.1914, whereas an expansion wasalready under way when war was
declared in September 1939. Neither 1914 and 1939, norAugust 1914
and September 1939 are coordinate with respect tothe stage of the
business cycle in which they occur. Had westarted our comparisons
at dates that were coordinate inthis respect (the trough years 1914
and 1938, or the trough months December 1914and May or June
1938) we would have found that theexpansion in the output of in-
dustrial materials lasted longer and proceeded at amuch more rapid
average rate in the second war thanin the first (cf. Chart 1,bottom).
However, there is no question but thatdepression in 1938 was much
more severe than in 1914.Our materials productionindex declines
18% from 1937 to 1938 but only 7% from 1913to 1914. Since the
capacity to produce the 1937 output maybe reasonably assumed to
have been on hand in 1938, unutilizedcapacity in 1938 must have been
at least sufficient to bring about a 23%expansion in output (the 1937
index is 23% above the 1938 index); in 1914the 'visible supply' of
unutilized capacity (judging from the levelof output at the preceding
peak, 1913) would have been enoughfor a 7% expansion only. The
latter figure is fairly close to what wewould estimate by this method
for 139, namely 3% (the 1937 index is 3%above the 1939 index).
Such comparisons, of course, do nottell us anything about the 'in-
visible supply' of unutilized resources,and our conclusions mightbe
altered if it was very much larger in 1913than in 1937. It is difficult
to obtain statistical data onthis point, but the scraps ofevidence
assembled in Table 3 are so consistentwith one another and with
general impressions as to the level ofactivity relative to capacity in
the two periods that the conclusions seemincontrovertible. Accord-
ing to the estimates of the NationalIndustrial Conference Board the
employment percentage was much higherin 1914 than in 1937, 1938,
or 1939, and was lowestin 1938.18 Although there is littlestatistical
information on employment andunemployment in 1914, so that over-
all estimates involve an element ofspeculation,14 the errors in the un-
employment estimates would have tobe very large to reverse the di-
rection of the difference between 1914and 1939; once this is deter-
mined, there can be no question about therelative position of 1938.
1$ These employment percentages did not approximate the1914 level until 1941. The
percentage was 85.9 in 1940 and 94.0 in 1941.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7In some respects one of the best ways to measurethe rate of change
in capacity to produce is to measure the trendof production. A fitted
trend line will of course pass through the dataand hence be at too low
a level to represent capacity output;but so far as we may assume(1)
that in the utilization of capacity long-runvariations are small relative
to short-run, and (2) that in capacityitself short-run variations are
small relative to long-run, the deviations fromthe line should indicate
the relative utilization of capacity in thevarious years. In the case of
industrial production as a whole, and particularlyindustrial materials
production, these assumptions do not seemunreasonable; hence we
indude in Table 3 two indexes of industrialproduction that cover our
periods and are published in trend-adjusted form.The ranking of the
five years 1913, 1914, 1937, 1938, and 1939,according to the Cleve-
land Trust Company index, is precisely the same asthat shown by the
employment percentages. The A. T. & T.index behaves somewhat
differentlythe relation between 1937and 1939, on the one hand,
and 1914 on the other, is reversedbut 1938is still far below 1914.
Our survey (which daims merely to coverindependent sources of
evidence, not to be exhaustive) is completedby a comparison of actual
productive activity with estimated capacity inthree important indus-
tries. In bituminous coal mining and cottonspinning the relations
among the five years with respectto utilization of capacity arethe
same as those shownby the employment percentages andthe Cleve-
land Trust Company index. In steel ingotproduction the ranking is
the same as that of the A. T. & T.index.
If we make all possible comparisonsbetween the estimates of
utilization of capacity in 1913 and 1914 onthe one hand, and 1937,
1938, and 1939 on the other, 1914 seemsundoubtedly more com-
parable with 1939 than with 1938 in respectof utilization of capacity.
But Table 3 suggests further that:(1) 1914 and 1937 may be more
comparable than 1914 and 1939; and (2)in both 1937 and 1939 the
relative utilization of capacity wasprobably somewhat lower than in
1914.
We should not, therefore, overlookthe possibility of using 1937 as
a base, in order toallow, in effect, for the difference inutilization of
capacity at the beginning of the two wars.Our index of materials pro-
duction then becomes: 1937, 100; 1938, 82;1939, 97; 1940, 111;
1941, 131; and 1942, 131. Outputin 1942 was 31% above the 1937
level; in 1917 it was 32% above the 1914level. Even admitting a
probable downward bias in our index due to itsconstant composition,
15
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the evidence surely does not substantiatea claim that production of
materials, relative to unutilized capacity existing at the beginningof
the war, has expanded muchmore rapidly in this war than in the pre-
ceding. The record is substantially thesame.
IICHANGES IN OUTPUT OF INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES
The indexes discussed in Section I show thatthe aggregate output of
industrial materials expanded in bothwars, but they do not tell us
which industries participated in this expansionand which did not,
or whether the industries, if any, that failed to expand inthe first
war failed also to expand in the second. They showtoo that in the
first three years of bothwars the average rate of expansion in the
total was about 10%per year, but they do not indicate which indus..
tries expanded more rapidly andwhich more slowly, or whetherthe
same industries behaved similarly in thisrespect in the two periods.
Finally, the indexessuggest that the rate of increase in the totalmay
have been higher in the secondwar than in the first, but fail to show
whether this is true of all productsor of what products it is true.
In order to answer thesequestions we constructed 14group indexes
based on classifications ofthe 47 commodity series inour total index
(Table 4 and Chart 4), andcalculated the annualpercentage rates of
change of the 14 indexes andthe 47 series for relevant periods(Tables 5 and 6). In both wars theproduction of almost all industrialmate- rials expanded. Onlytwo of the 14 indexes, forestproducts andnon-
metal construction materials(which overlap considerablysince lum- ber is the majorconstituent of each), decline from1914 to 1917, and only one, products offoreign origin, declinesfrom 1939 to 1942.
Thirty-five of the 47 individualcommodity series increased inthe first war period,39 in the second Accordingto the weights used in our index (cf. App. Tables3 and 5) theaggregate value in 1914 of
the commodities thatincreased from 1914to 1917 was 78% of the total value of the 47commodities. The correspondingfigure (1939 weights) for the commoditiesthat rose from1939 to 1942 is 92%. Consequently wemay say that the expansionin the secondwar was more general than in the first.
Five commodityseries (turpentine,cottonseed oil, calf and kip leather, distilled spirits,and sugar meltings)declined in both periods; seven (linseed oil, sand andgravel, lumber,crushed limestone, canned tomatoes, malt liquors, andsheep and lambsslaughter) declined in the first butrose in the second; whilethree (rubberimports, tin con-
16